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ARGUMENT

Sundquist's supplemental brief offers no valid reason for this Court not to
overrule its prior decision in this case, Federal National Mortgage Association v.
Sundquist, 2013 UT 45. Neither the law-of-the-case doctrine nor stare decisis
justifies adherence to that decision.

I.

LAW OF THE CASE

As Bank of America's supplemental brief explained (at 1-2), this Court has
held that the law-of-the-case doctrine-when applied to the same court that issued
the earlier ruling, rather than to a lower court-does not "rise to the dignity of res
judicata or stare decisis." Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397
(Utah 1977), quoted in State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 1
Sundquist apparently agrees, as her supplemental brief offers no direct response.
Bank of America's supplemental brief also argued (at 2) that the standard for not
adhering to a prior ruling under the law-of-the-case doctrine is met here for the
reasons given in Bank of America's opening and reply briefs. Here too, Sundquist
offers no direct response to most of those reasons. In particular, she says nothing
about any of the following central points in Bank of America's reply brief:
• Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a presumption against preemptionon which Sundquist' s merits brief relied heavily-does not apply here
(Reply 2-5);
Bank of America's opening supplemental brief mistakenly cited O'Neil as a
decision of this Court.
- 143605248;1
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• Whether the term "trustee" in 12 U.S.C. §92a includes trustees on deed· of
trust is a question of federal law rather than (as Sundquist contended) state
law-and the Comptroller of the Currency has long held that the term does
include such trustees (Reply 5-6);
• Contrary to Sundquist' s assertion that the Comptroller's interpretation
should not receive Chevron deference, the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the Comptroller's interpretations of federal banking law
(such as §92a) are entitled to such deference (Reply 7);
• Section 92a addresses only authorization to act in a fiduciary capacity in a
particular state; it does not bear on states' substantive fiduciary laws, which
Sundquist's brief repeatedly invoked (Reply 8-1 0);
• The Comptroller's regulation is reasonable, including because it closely
tracks the analysis the U.S. Supreme Court embraced in Marquette National
Bank v. First of Omaha Services Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)-and even if
Sundquist were offering a better alternative (which she is not), that would
not render the Comptroller's approach so irrational as to deprive it of
Chevron deference (Reply 10-17); and
• Notwithstanding Sundquist's misplaced invocation of the ejusdem generis
canon of statutory construction, section 92a(b) independently authorized the
foreclosure sale here (Reply 17-20).
Again, these points are relevant to the supplemental briefing because they
show why this Court should overrule Sundquist notwithstanding the law-of-thecase doctrine. And rather than speaking directly to any of the points, Sundquistafter offering lengthy quotations on undisputed points (Supp. Br. 1-2)-largely
repeats arguments she made in her merits brief. But again, Bank of America's
reply brief fully addressed those arguments, and Sundquist simply ignores those
reply points. That silence is telling.

-243605248;1
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The few points Sundquist does make-all of which are supported by no
citations to authority of any kind-are unavailing. She first contends (Supp. Br. 2)
that the reason Utah law limits the power of sale to certain entities is to "give[] the
citizens of Utah access to directly meet with the foreclosing party." Id. at 2. As
noted, however, section 92a does not displace states' substantive laws governing
fiduciaries' conduct (such as a requirement for a pre-foreclosure meeting). See
supra p.2 (citing Appellant's Reply 8-10). Such substantive laws are not what is at

issue here. What is at issue is a law regarding authorization to act as a fiduciary.
Those laws are preempted. And that preemption cannot be defeated with rhetoric
about state law being designed "to prevent a manifest injustice ... to ... Utah
citizens." Sundquist Supp. Br. 2. As an initial matter, what occurred here was no
injustice at all; Sundquist's property was foreclosed only after she paid nothing on
her mortgage for years-without ever even attempting to contact ReconTrust. But
more to the point, state laws that are preempted frequently have protection of local
or in-state interests as their objective. That is irrelevant to the preemption inquiry.
Sundquist next argues (Supp. Br. 3) that "[f]oreclosure is not a fiduciary
activity of a trustee," and that "using Texas law to foreclose on real property in
Utah is not reasonable." But as explained, see supra p.2, Bank of America's reply
brief fully responded to both points (at 5-7 and 10-17); Sundquist's conclusory
claims (which, again, lack any supporting authority) just ignore those responses.

-343605248~1
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Finally, Sundquist asserts (Supp. Br. 3) that "[t]he OCC regulation is an
attempt to take away the states' rights to regulate de~t collection and the real estate
within its borders." Here too, Sundquist is simply ignoring what Bank of America
has repeatedly explained, namely that federal law does not preempt states'
substantive laws and regulations of trustees' fiduciary activities.

States thus

remain free, notwithstanding section 92a, "to regulate debt collection and the real
estate within [their] borders." Id. But they may not impose outright restrictions on
an entity's authority to act as a trustee in the first place.
In short, Sundquist' s decision to rely exclusively on cursory arguments that
Bank of America has thoroughly addressed provides no basis for this Court to
adhere to Sundquist despite all the points made in Bank of America's briefs, by the
U.S. Solicitor General in his amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in this case,
and by the Tenth Circuit in Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2016).
II.

STARE DECISIS 2

1.

Bank of America's supplemental brief explained (at 2-5) that

overruling Sundquist would be warranted even if this Court used the more

2

The body of Sundquist' s supplemental brief (although not the table of
contents) uses identical headers for both parts of her argument (Supp. Br. 1, 3).
But her ~ctual arguments track those in Bank of America's opening supplemental
brief, i.e., Part I addresses law of the case while Part II addresses stare decisis. For
example, her substantive argument in Part II begins: "The question whether to
overrule the Court's prior decision, notwithstanding ... stare decisis, requires
evaluation of two factors." Supp. Br. 3 (emphasis added).
-443605248;1
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demanding rubric of stare decisis, rather than the less demanding rubric of law of
the case-although the latter is what actually applies because Sundquist was of
course a prior ruling in this case. In response, Sundquist first asserts (Supp. Br. 1,
3) that Bank of America's stare decisis arguments violate this Court's order for
supplemental briefing. That is wrong. As Sundquist acknowledges (Supp. Br. 1),
Bank of America's arguments regarding law of the case were proper under the
Court's order.

And the only difference between those arguments and the

supposedly improper ones is that the former addressed overruling a prior decision
in the same case (law of the case) while the latter addressed overruling of a prior
decision in a different case (stare decisis ). Both groups of arguments are proper
because whether or not this Court's prior decision was issued in this litigation or
another, the Court of Appeals would have been equally bound by it-and hence the
recall of the case by this Court effects an equally material change in the posture of
this appeal from when it was before the Court of Appeals.
2.

Sundquist's substantive responses regarding stare decisis lack merit.

As an initial matter, although she correctly recites the two factors relevant to the
stare decisis analysis (Supp. Br. 3 ), she says nothing at all about the second--even
though Bank of America's supplemental brief discussed that factor at length. Here
again, Sundquist's failure to offer any response is revealing.

-543605248;1
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As to the factor she does address, the "persuasiveness of the authority and
reasoning on which the precedent was originally based," Sundquist first states
(Supp. Br. 3) that this Court's prior decision was "very persuasive in its application
of Utah state law, because that law is very clear and unambiguous." But the issue
here is not what Utah law provides; it is whether that law is preempted. And
Sundquist's single-sentence recitation of this Court's conclusion (Supp. Br. 4) only
begs the question whether that conclusion was based on persuasive authority and
reasonmg.
Sundquist's smattering of arguments do nothing to answer that question in
her favor. To the contrary, she again repeats arguments in her brief to the Court of
Appeals, while ignoring Bank of America's responses to those arguments in its
reply brief.

For example, she asserts (Supp. Br. 4) that "[r]egulation of debt

collection is historically governed by state laws not federal law." But as discussed
both above (pp. 2, 4) and in its reply brief (at 8-9), Bank of America does not argue
that the Comptroller's regulation preempts substantive state fiduciary law.
Similarly, Sundquist again argues (Supp. Br. 4) that section 92a(a) does not apply
to trustees on a deed of trust. As explained, however, the Comptroller's contrary
interpretation controls.
Sundquist next reprises her argument that Utah law is not preempted because
the parties agreed in the deed of trust that Utah law would apply. See Supp. Br. 4;

-643605248;1
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compare Sundquist Court of Appeals Br. 1-2 n.2, 3, 5, 16-17. But that agreement
means only that substantive Utah laws apply; laws regarding authorization to serve
as a fiduciary, meanwhile, are preempted and do not apply. See Reply Br. 15. And
as to Sundquist's assertion (Supp. Br. 4) that Bank of America has not shown "the
clear and manifest intent of Congress" to preempt state law, no such showing is
necessary because the presumption against preemption does not apply here. See
Reply Br. 2-4. Again, all this was laid out in Bank of America's reply brief, and
Sundquist simply ignores it.
Finally, Sundquist offers (Supp. Br. 5) a block quote from this Court's prior
decision listing four federal district court cases that held Utah law not preempted.
But all four are now bad law in light of Dutcher, because all four resolved the issue
at Chevron step one (although only one of the four actually cited Chevron). For
example, in Bell v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 2012),
the district court stated that "[a]fter carefully examining the statute's plain
meaning, together with the legislative history of the statute, the court has
determined that Congress has directly addressed this precise question," id. at 1300
(emphasis added).

As the court stated earlier in its opinion, see id. at 1297,

"precise question," is the Chevron step-one analysis. Similarly, in Cox v. Recon-

Trust Co., 2011 WL 835893 (D. Utah Mar. 3, 2011), the district court stated that
"[u]nder a straightforward reading of§ 92a(b), this court must look to Utah law,"

-743605248;1
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id. at *6 (emphasis added). That is likewise a Chevron step-one holding. And the
other two district court cases simply quoted and followed this holding from Cox,
without further analysis. See Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., 2011 WL 13135602, at
*1 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011); Loomis v. Meridias Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 5844304, at
*1-2 (D. Utah Nov. 18, 2011). Dutcher's square rejection of Sundquist's Chevron
step-one holding thus abrogated all four of these cases (in which the same step-one
argument was advanced).
To be sure, Bell went on to conclude in dicta that Utah law would apply
under Chevron step two as well. See Bell, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 ("[F]or the sake
of completeness, the court will also examine the reasonableness of the
Comptroller's interpretation found in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d)."). That dicta was not
affected by Dutcher because the Tenth Circuit did not address Chevron step two.

See 840 F.3d at 1205. But dicta from a single district court does little to show that
Sundquist was sufficiently persuasive and soundly reasoned to warrant adherence
under stare decisis-particularly given the contrary views expressed in the amicus
briefs of the Solicitor General (in this case) and the OCC (in Dutcher), and given
that Bell's dicta did not address most of the step-two arguments advanced by Bank
of America here (for example, that the Comptroller's interpretation tracks the
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Marquette).

-843605248;1
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CONCLUSION

The Court should overrule Sundquist and reverse the trial court's judgment.
Dated: December 12, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

DANIELS. VOLCHOK
(admitted pro hac vice)
WILMER CUTLER PtCKERfNG
HALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 663-6000

ROBERT H. SCOTT
AKERMANLLP
170 South Main Street, Suite 950
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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